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ABSTRACT
The Peace Process : A Case Study 
by
Erika Lee Berlant
Dr. Andrew Tuttle, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Political Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis is a case study of the ongoing peace 
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, and the 
lack of impact that past agreements have made on the recent 
Oslo Accords. The thesis will attempt to show that past 
failures in 'land for peace' agreements between Israel and 
Arab countries only illustrate what is in store for the Oslo 
Accords. In addition, the current Israeli administration's 
failure to concede the disputed land in the occupied 
territories is in part, due to the fear of an emerging 
Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The 
dangers of an independent Palestinian state will be 
examined, both the strategic and geographic implications, 
and some economic difficulties the Israelis will be faced 
with. Finally, the continuing impact of the PLO's role in 
this arena will be examined.
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C H A P T E R  1
INTRODUCTION
Land for Peace
The concept of "land for peace" was created by 
Israel as a possible bargaining tool. Israel would 
grant autonomy or sovereignty to the Palestinians over 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and this sacrifice 
would be in exchange for peace with its Arab neighbors.
It is a situation that is not easily solved and a 
policy that could eventually do more harm than good.
It will always be hard to determine the outcome of 
these exchanges, unless certain historical facts are 
examined. History has shown that Israel's concession 
of land to Arabs has not had the effect that was hoped 
for. In fact, in some instances, the opposite of peace 
has been the outcome. There has been more violence and 
aggression on the part of Arab nations.
There have been many attempts by the Israeli 
government to give back land in exchange for peace. The 
Israelis have constantly given back land acquired from the 
Arabs after being attacked by them. There were UN 
Resolutions 242 and 338. These were the beginnings of the
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2failing concept of "land for peace." Soon after, there were 
the famous Camp David Accords, which were supposed to 
further the lingering peace process. These particular 
Accords were signed by both Israel and Egypt with the 
persistence of then President Jimmy Carter. These accords 
have yet to show the results intended. Finally, there is 
the present Oslo Accords, signed by Yitzak Rabin 
(Former Israeli Prime Minister) and PLO leader, Yasser 
Arafat. Yet, again, this proposes Israeli concession of 
land for hopes of change. There has always been the hope on 
the behalf of the Israelis', that terrorism will cease and 
that concession will bring peace and non-aggression. So 
far, the pursuit of concessions has not been a fruitful 
strategy. The Israeli government's history of proposed 
concessions should speak for itself.
The Arabs have not shown good faith and have not once 
lived up to their end of the peace negotiations. Terrorism 
and aggression continued during each of these pacts, and 
continue at this moment in time. Historically, this 
strategy has been a failure and the Israelis must find a new 
direction towards peace, if possible.
Furthermore, it is too naive for the Israeli 
government to think that Oslo will be different. Time after 
time, Israel has given back land that was conquered in war 
waged on them by Arab countries. It was usually at the 
request of the United states or other nations that thought
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
3it unfair to occupy another country's land, even though the 
acquisition was in self-defense.
Since the Jewish state was established, Israel has 
tried to make concessions to various Arab countries, to stop 
violence and curb their feelings of anger regarding the 
supposed displacement of their Palestinian Arab brethren. 
These concessions to Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and others, were 
never enough and concluding from history, never will be.
The Arabs did not want some land, they wanted all of Israel 
to be extinguished. Trying to appease them by giving up a 
little land, was and is not the answer.
The Security of Israel 
What could the consequences be for Israel if a greater 
portion of the land that surrounds it is given back to an 
obviously hostile people? There is much dissent in Israel 
over the long term implications of relinquishing these 
territories. Yitzak Rabin believed that peace would have 
been the outcome, when he decided to sign Oslo, but there 
are those that doubt that peace will ever exist, because 
underlying every issue that the Arabs have raised over 
Israeli borders, the main issue is still the hatred of the 
Jews and the hostility towards Israel's existence. 
Furthermore, the West Bank and Gaza will most likely not be 
enough in the future. Arab nations such as; Syria, portions 
of Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, and other extremist Islamic groups, 
still call for the destruction of Israel and some would
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
4claim that all of Palestine belongs to them, as the PLO (in 
its Covenant and in its 1974 Cairo Declaration) does. The 
consequences of these feelings could wreak havoc on Israel. 
Israel cannot really afford to deny these realities.
The geographical location of Israel is another 
security problem. Does the fact that Israel is surrounded 
by hostile neighbors pose a threat to its security if it 
were reduced to an indefensible size? The Palestinians 
might look at this new size as an opportunity to try to 
seize the rest of the territory they see as theirs. Syria 
has always thought of Israel as a part of Greater Syria.
So, it becomes a possibility that Syria might try to take 
advantage of a considerably smaller Israel. On all fronts, 
the Israelis are surrounded by people who have been their 
sworn enemies for over 50 years, and if these territories 
are relinquished, Israel has two new fronts to fear. This 
geographical disadvantage should have been, and should still 
be, a basis for reconsidering Oslo's suggestions. The West 
Bank and Gaza should never be totally relinquished.
Inter-Arab Conflict 
Inter-Arab conflict has been a problem in the Middle 
East for centuries, and could very easily be heightened by 
granting total independence to Palestinian Arabs. It is 
what Arabs have been fighting for over 50 years, but a new 
Palestinian state would have a direct effect on how they 
conduct their foreign affairs. When the Palestinians have
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
5been granted a home, the Arab coalition will have no 
scapegoat to use as leverage for universal demands.
Arab nations fear for their own security. For 
instance, a Palestinian state on the West Bank could 
threaten Jordan. It is no secret that the Hashemite 
regime's relationship with the PLO is on shaky grounds and 
Jordan is seen by Palestinian militants as the other half of 
Palestine. There is a legitimate fear here. The majority 
of Jordan's population is Palestinian and a substantial 
amount will want to join the East Bank with a Palestinian 
Arab state on the West Bank.
The same idea stretches to cover the Arab nation of 
Syria. Syria will predictably not allow a Palestinian state 
to exist for too long. How long will Syria hesitate before 
trying to take back what is supposedly its own?
It is worthy to mention that there are hostile 
factions within the PLO that certainly will and do, fight 
amongst themselves, and with others to control a new 
Palestinian state and preserve it. These facts contribute 
to the doubts that "land for peace" can really bring about 
its objectives.
Conclusion
The conclusion will try to show that the Israeli 
attempt to buy peace will not be fruitful. There might be 
dangers facing Israel in the future, like its own security 
and the inter-Arab conflicts that will be laid at its
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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the circumstances noted above.
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C H A P T E R  2
THE HISTORY OF LAND FOR PEACE
Land for Peace
At the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the
Zionists in Israel would recognize different British
proposals for a peaceful settlements. After the Arabs
rejected a proposal put before them by the Zionists in the
early 1930's to create separate, but equal political
recognition (which gave them equality without giving notice
to the fact of majority/minority status), the Zionists
continued to try to appease the Arabs.- Samuel Katz writes
in his book Battleground :
...in 1937, the Zionist leaders agreed, again for 
the sake of peace [italics mine], to share out the 
Country, dividing what remained of the original 
Mandated territory of Palestine after Eastern 
Palestine had been given to the Arabs by the 
British. They accepted as a basis the partition 
scheme proposed by the British Royal Commission.
The proposed Jewish miniature state would have been 
highly indefensible. The Arab leaders rejected the 
plan out of hand, and the British government buried 
it .-
-Samuel Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in 
Palestine (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, New York: 
Steimatzky/Shapolsky, 1985)254-56 .
-Ibid. , 256 .
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Katz writes again of a rejected Israeli concession:
A third effort at accommodation was made in 1947.
The Jewish underground having compelled the British 
to relinquish their hold on Palestine, the Zionist 
leaders once again announced their willingness to 
accept a scheme of partition as a means of putting 
an end to the conflict [italics mine]. The Zionist 
leaders accepted the United Nations partition 
proposal, which included a ludicrously vulnerable 
Jewish state. They persuaded themselves once more 
that a heavy sacrifice would win the hearts of the 
Arabs.^
These rejections by the Arabs were just the beginnings of a 
long line of peace proposals that were either buried, 
rejected, or accepted only later to be violated. For 
example, after the 1956 Suez War, the "Israelis withdrew 
from the Sinai to the armistice Line in exchange for 
Egyptian promises to keep the Suez Canal and the Straits of 
Tiran open to Israeli shipping; to prevent guerilla 
activities against Israel from its territory; and in due 
course make peace...The Six Day War in 1967 was precipitated 
by Egypt's use of force to close the Straits to Israeli 
shipping."' In addition, Egypt never halted terrorist 
activities against Israel. Quite the opposite took place; 
Egypt still proposed the destruction of Israel and continued
^Samuel Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in Palestine 
(Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, New York: Steimatzsky/Shapolsky,
1985)257.
■’Eugene Rostow, "Resolution 242-A Historical" in Can 
Israel Survive a Palestinian State?, ed. Michael Widlanski 
(Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political 
Studies),102.
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its anti-Semitic propaganda,
UN Resolution 242 and 338 
In 1967 and 1973, the United Nations proposed two 
separate resolutions, that were designed to work together, 
to bring peace between the Israelis and the Arabs, "The 338 
rule defines the vehicle through which peace should be 
reached: negotiations between parties,- while the 242 rule 
describes this future peace environment."' On November 22, 
1967, after the Six Day War between Israel and the Arabs, 
Resolution 242 was originated. War was being waged from 
distances extremely close to the Israeli borders. Israel 
defended itself with great success and "gained control of 
the remainder of Western Palestine clear to the Jordan 
River, of the Golan Heights, and of the Sinai Peninsula down 
to the Suez Canal and the Red Sea."’' Resolution 242 stated 
that the Israelis would discontinue occupation of some or 
all of the territories in question-the West Bank, Gaza, and 
the Golan Heights, as long as a true and durable peace 
settlement could be agreed upon by both parties.'
Legally, according to this document, Israel may
’Ze'ev Begin, A Zionist Stand (London: Frank Cass & 
Co., 1993)133.
"Samuel Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in 
Palestine (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, New York: 
Steimatzky/Shapolsky, 1985)2.
"'Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1993)289-90.
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continue to occupy those areas in question until there is a 
cessation of aggression towards it, and recognition of its 
right to exist in peace and security is concluded. The 
resolution was carefully written this way because of events 
between Israel and Egypt in 1956, when Egypt violated its 
agreement and used force to keep Israel out of the Straits 
of Tiran. ^ It was clear that this clause was necessary 
because, otherwise, the Arabs might concentrate solely on 
the statement of withdrawal. As it turned out, it did not 
matter what other requirements may have been necessary for 
Israeli withdrawal from the regions, the Arabs still 
concentrated on mandatory Israeli withdrawal.
The objectives of Resolution 242 proved to be a source 
of tension for over twenty years. The Arabs consistently 
refused to make peace with the Israelis ostensibly because 
they would not withdraw from the territories in question 
(but in reality because they refused to accept Israel), and 
the Israelis refused to withdraw because the Arabs would not 
sign any agreements of peace. And, the Israelis had the 
right to remain exactly where they were and the Arabs chose 
to ignore the very clear instructions set forth in 
Resolution 242. Eugene Rostow cites part of the Resolution 
in his essay Resolution 242-A Historical Perspective:
^Eugene Rostow, "Resolution 242-A Historical Perspective" 
in Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State? Ed. Michael 
Widlanski (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and 
Political Studies, 1990)102.
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The Resolution specifies that "the fulfillment of 
Charter principles requires the establishment of a 
just and lasting peace in the Middle East which 
would include the application of the following 
Principles: (i) withdrawal of armed forces from
territories of recent conflict; and (ii) . . .respect 
for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, and political independence 
of every state in the area and their right to live 
in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.
The Resolution did not require the Israelis to withdraw from
all territories, period. Furthermore, it did not require
that the Israelis withdraw at all until peace and
recognition of sovereignty were agreed upon by all parties.
Rostow further notes, "It is not possible to say that the
Resolution is ambiguous on this point or that it requires
Israel to accept the 1967 boundaries.
Resolution 338, which was written six years later on 
October 22, 1973, originated at a time when Resolution 242
still had not been recognized. Resolution 338 orders that 
"negotiations start between the parties concerned under the 
appropriate auspices, aimed at establishing a just and 
lasting peace in the Middle East."- These Resolutions 
never resulted in their original intent, which was to bring 
peace and stability to the region.
Israel has, over the years, shown good faith. They
^Michael Widlanski, Can Israel Survive a Palestinian 
State? (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and 
Political Studies, 1990)103.
10Ibid.,103.
—Ze'ev Begin, "The Likud Vision," Foreign Affairs Fall 
(1991)25 .
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have consistently agreed to relinquish territory, as long as
Arab terrorism ceased and an agreement on their sovereignty
could be reached. Since these Resolutions were written,
Israel has offered to make further concessions. These
consist of 1) the return of the Sinai Peninsula to the
Egyptians, and 2) the return of portions of the Golan
Heights to Syria. The return of the Peninsula was a
dangerous move, considering it was vital to Israeli security
and the Golan Heights sits above the Northern half of
Israel. Still, Israel offered these concessions.— Even
with Israeli cooperation, the Arab nations have not felt
compelled to do the same. It is the Arab contention that
Israel must relinquish all territory, period. Benjamin
Netanyahu wrote :
It took twelve years for Egypt to comply with 
Security Council Resolution. In explicitly refusing 
to make peace with Israel, the other twenty Arab 
states flout the dictates of Resolution 242 to this 
day. Yet, with unsurpassed hypocrisy, they reverse 
casualty yet again and claim that it is Israel that 
is in violation of the Resolution with which they 
themselves have yet to make the slightest gesture 
of compliance.
Netanyahu goes on to observe that the Arabs have completely
misused the wording of the Resolution to fit their argument;
Their accusations are based on an additional clause 
in Resolution 242, which calls for "withdrawal of 
Israeli armed forces from areas occupied in the 
recent conflict." Israel, claim the Arabs, have
“Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1993)290-91.
13Ibid.,290-91.
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never obeyed the directive to withdraw from "the 
territories." Why should they make peace, when 
Israel is still in possession of the West Bank, the 
Golan, and Gaza? They conveniently chose to forget 
that any Israeli withdrawal was supposed to follow 
the signing of peace agreements, which the Arab 
states adamantly refuse to sign.-’
The Arabs have never changed their hostile sentiments
towards the Israelis. This continual hostility should have
made the process of giving back land for peace look futile.
However, and for whatever reasons, Israel tried this again
in the 1970's with the Camp David Accords. As expected, che
results were quite the same.
The Camp David Accords 
The first peace treaty ever signed with an Arab 
country came into existence twelve years after the UN 
Resolutions. After twelve years, an Arab country decided to 
make some concessions after Israel had made so many in those
intermittent years. The treaty, a direct result of the
negotiations at Camp David, was influenced by another war 
that had been waged upon Israel: the Yom Kippur War. During 
the Yom Kippur War, Israel was able to regain its occupation 
of the Golan Heights, taken from Syria in the 1967 attack 
(it took Israel approximately ten days to recapture the 
Golan from Syria, who conquered the Heights in the Yom 
Kippur attack). In addition, Israel took control of some of
"Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1993)291.
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Egypt's land inside its borders."
Jimmy Carter, the U.S. President at the time, proposed
the negotiations between Menahim Begin, of Israel, and Anwar
Sadat, of Egypt. This was the beginning of the Camp David
Accords, taking the name from the location of the
negotiations in Camp David, Maryland. The framework of the
Accords were as such:
The two nations were to conclude a peace treaty 
within three months. Israel would withdraw from 
the entire Sinai Peninsula and turn it back to 
Egypt. The area would be demilitarized. The 
Israeli pullout would occur in phases...the first 
one taking place within three to nine months after 
the signing of the peace treaty. Normal diplomatic 
relations would then be established. The final 
withdrawal would be carried out within two to three 
years after the pact was signed."
The pact had two parts :
The first part included Israel's promise to withdraw 
from all of the Sinai in return for peace and 
normalization of relations. Although Egypt was to 
exercise its sovereignty over the relinquished 
areas, it agreed to certain security arrangements. 
The second part contained self-rule, or autonomy, 
plan for the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria, 
and Gaza."
The West Bank and Gaza were given special attention.
It was agreed that "Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and elected 
Palestinian representatives would negotiate the key
'■^ Samuel Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasv in 
Palestine (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, New York: 
Steimatzky/Shapolsky, 1985)223.
"Lester A. Sobel, Peace-Making in the Middle East (New 
York: Facts-on-File, Inc., 1980)223.
"Yael Yishai, Land or Peace: Whither Israel?
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987)21.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 5
questions of sovereignty of the Israeli-occupied territory 
after a five year transition period. Israel would conclude 
a peace treaty at the end of that time.""
There were additional provision added, such as keeping 
Israeli troops in the Israeli-occupied territories until the 
five year period was over; the eventual autonomy of the 
Palestinians, although "there was a tacit acknowledgment of 
Israel's special position in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, which 
granted it a veto on issues such as the setting up of a 
Palestinian state, a strong role in internal security, and a 
substantial say in the determination of the specific powers 
and responsibilities of the self-governing authority"; and 
sharing police duties with Jordan and Egypt.-'
The utopian vision behind the drafting of these 
Accords was that other Arab nations would be an eventual 
party to the treaty. However, other Arab nations wanted 
nothing to do with the treaty or the signing of it. Most of 
Egypt's Arab neighbors branded Sadat a traitor and an 
opposition coalition began. King Hussein of Jordan refused 
to be a party to the Accords because "Amman was not a party 
to the pacts" and PLO leader Yasser Arafat accused Sadat of
"Lester A. Sobel, Peace-Making in the Middle East (New 
York: Facts-on-File, Inc., 1980)223.
"Yael Yishai, Land or Peace: Whither Israel (Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1987)21.
^Lester A. Sobel, Peace-Making in the Middle East (New 
York: Facts-on-File, Inc.)223-24.
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making agreements that did not accurately represent the 
people."* The Arabs made attempts to block peace by cutting 
all ties with Egypt and boycotting Egyptian business. In 
addition, there were massive terrorist attacks upon Israel 
and Egypt. Again, Israel was agreeing to give up land for 
peace and the Arabs balked at the gesture.
As years passed, it seemed as if Egypt had a difficult 
time upholding its end of the agreement. Martin Sicker, 
author of Israel's Quest for Security, wrote that "The 
provisions in the treaty that call for normalization of 
relations were never really taken seriously in Egypt, and 
the peace accord soon dwindled to nothing more than a treaty 
of nonbelligerence."'* Egypt's idea of peace was probably 
one of a simple cessation of tensions, and not a long term 
commitment. In an article entitled "The Illusion of Land 
for Peace", it has been written that "The Camp David Accords 
(Article 3, Clause 5) call for Egypt and Israel to 'refrain 
from hostile propaganda [directed at one another]...'
Egypt's government controlled press repeatedly violated this 
obligation...""' After Israel had already given up vital
-'-Lester A. Sobel, Peace-Makincr in the Middle East (New 
York: Facts-on-File, Inc) 226.
Ibid. ,262-64 .
'^'Martin Sicker, Israel's Guest for Security (New York : 
Praeger Publishing, 1989)161.
-•*Joel Weingarten, "The Illusion of Land for Peace, " The 
National Interest Summer (1989)114.
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territory on the Peninsula, Egypt had the opportunity to
abrogate the agreement :
On April 21 and May 3, 1987, . . . El Abram. . .affirmed
that Israel exports irradiated foodstuffs to Egypt,
saying that this was an Israeli conspiracy aimed at 
spreading death. In December 1988, the government: 
owned newspaper El Akkhar claimed that Israel was 
the most likely culprit in the terrorist bombing 
of Pan Am flight 103 which exploded over Lockerbie, 
Scotland on December 21, killing 259 passengers..."
On these dates noted above, Egypt was under different 
leadership than the time of the treaty signing. However,
the treaty was still binding, although not according to
Egypt. Leadership was irrelevant, however, because neither 
Sadat, nor the newer Mubarak, considered the treaty legally 
binding until Israel rescinded Gaza and the West Bank.-"
This was not a requirement of Israel until certain 
conditions were met and those conditions were not met. This 
is another example of Arab leaders negating their 
responsibilities.
Diplomatic relations were supposed to be in effect as 
a condition of the treaty. Israel would withdraw from the 
Sinai and Egypt would cease negative propaganda and violence
^^Joel Weingarten "The Illusion of Land for Peace," The 
National Interest Summer(1989), 115.
^®Ibid.,114. Weingarten writes that "As Egyptian 
President Sadat made clear , and as his successor Mr.
Mubarak has affirmed, Egypt sees maintenance of the treaty 
predicated upon Israel's forfeiture of Judea and Samaria to 
the Arab Palestinians. Therefore, Egypt sees no obligation 
to uphold the treaty if Israel does not give back additional 
territories to third parties. However, Mr. Mubarak has not 
said that Egypt would be willing to return the Sinai to 
Israel if Egypt declares the treaty null and void."
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and enter diplomacy. Of course, this idea of diplomacy
dwindled away:
At the height of the Lebanese War in 1982, Eg^-pt's 
President Mubarak withdrew his ambassador to Israel. 
He then laid down terms for a resumption of 
diplomatic ties which called for Israel to withdraw 
from Lebanon in a manner 'not contingent' upon 
a Syrian withdrawal. Ultimately, Egypt did not 
agree to return its ambassador to Israel until the 
end of 1986. It should further be noted that since 
1981 Egypt has only agreed to one summit meeting 
between the Egyptian and Israeli leaders-and that 
was at the behest of the United States.-"
Egypt decided to react and abide by the treaty on its own
terms, as if the original treaty did not exist. Other terms
of the agreement have been violated. For instance, a
normalization of trade and tourism was to develop but this
never materialized, "...Egypt has placed an almost total
embargo on trade with Israel, and tourism has evolved into a
one way street. Though Israelis are eager to spend their
leisure dollars in Cairo, Egypt discourages its citizens
from traveling to Israel."^®
The most important violation of the Accords has been
Egypt's resistance to the deterrence of terrorist activities
directed against Israeli citizens. In fact, "Egypt has
aided the PLO by providing its terrorist with safe havens in
Cairo and allowing them to launch attacks against Israel
^^Joel Weingarten,"The Illusion of Land for Peace," The 
National Interest Summer (1989)115.
:»Ibid.
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from its borders."^' The Accords proved to be a failure in 
the ongoing strategy of "land for peace." Israel conceded 
and Arab nations demanded more. Egypt literally made the 
treaty defunct.
So, what was different in Oslo? The Oslo Accords have 
been signed, but the Accords have not been any more 
effective than others of the past; with the primary emphasis 
being on Israel withdrawal from the occupied territories, 
and not on a cessation of terrorism and violence.
The Oslo Accords 
The newest venture in the land for peace agreements is 
the Oslo Accords, originally drafted and embarked upon by 
U.S. President Bill Clinton and the former Israeli Prime 
Minister Rabin. The draft is familiar, in that Israel gives 
up more than it will receive. In this last proposal, Israel 
comes dangerously close to authorizing a separate 
Palestinian state, which has been an avoided issue for years 
by all Israeli governments. Israel granted autonomy to the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip in return for peace, leaving 
itself completely vulnerable. Oslo has proved to be as 
ineffective as the others in convincing the Arabs to 
peacefully coexist.
^®Joel Weingarten, "The Illusion of Land for Peace," The 
National Interest Summer (1989)115. He cites examples of 
terrorist attacks against Israel. One example was in March 
1988, when six Israeli civilians were killed on a bus that 
was attacked by terrorists. The terrorists might have been 
helped through the Israeli border by the Egyptians.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 0
In 1991, the first phase of these negotiations took 
place at a conference in Madrid, which was overseen by the 
United States and the Soviet Union. In the article "Arabs 
and Israelis : Slow Walk Towards Peace", it is written that 
"the framework for negotiations called for bilateral 
discussions between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, 
and Israel and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. 
Eight sets of bilateral sessions had taken place by the end 
of 1992 . " ' °
There were further issues that were discussed during 
these initial negotiations such as; arms control, regional 
security, economic development, refugees, the environment, 
and water resources.'* The issues here were discussed along 
multilateral lines, with every negotiating party involved. 
The process was difficult because every side had 
reservations about the process. For instance, the Israelis 
did not want to negotiate with any member of the PLO and the 
Syrians were hesitant about attending as well.'*
Nevertheless, Israel eventually met with not only 
Syria, but with Yasser Arafat, the leader of the PLO.
Rabin's Labor Party was more flexible than earlier leaders 
like Shamir and his Likud Party, or the present Prime
'°M. Graeme Bannerman, "Arabs and Israelis: Slow Walk 
Towards Peace," Foreign Affairs vol.72, no.l (1992-93)152.
•^'I b i d .
-^Ibid. The Syrians did not want multilateral talks until 
satisfactory bilateral talks were held.
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Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Rabin started negotiating
concessions on land that the Likud party would have never
compromised on for the sake of security and peace, for
instance, the possibility of relinquishing Jerusalem was
contemplated. Bannerman asserts:
The... Israeli government appears to support the 
view that UN Security Council Resolution 242 does 
indeed apply to all fronts, including the Golan 
Heights. Rabin has worked to lead Israeli public 
opinion to perceive the benefits of peace as well 
as the need for additional concessions."
Rabin put forth the idea that the Israelis were willing in
the future to make even more sacrifices. At this point, the
Israelis and the Palestinians had different principles laid
out about interim self-government and the future of the
Palestine becoming its own state. The Israelis opposed any
interim government authority and the Palestinians thought it
necessary. Israel was worried about its security and the
Palestinians were worried about their pride.^ However, it
was expected that Rabin's party would become more flexible
about interim self-governing and this was a correct
assumption.
During the years from the Madrid Conference until the 
signing of the Declaration of Principles on September 13, 
1993, between Israel and the PLO, many relevant events and
-^M. Graeme Bannerman, "Arabs and Israelis: Slow Walk 
Towards Peace," Foreign Affairs vol.72, no.l (1992-93)154.
^Adam Garfinkle, "Documentation: Israeli and Palestinian 
Proposals for the West Bank," Orbis Summer (1992)432.
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advances took place. In the CRS Issue Brief, they were
summed up as follows:
Bilateral talks followed in Washington between 
December 1991 and September 1993, with Israel,
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians, 
emphasizing different sides of the "territory for 
peace" exchange enshrined in UN Resolution 242. 
Israel and the Palestinians discussed a 5-year 
period of interim self-rule leading to a final 
settlement.
In addition to this progress, there were other 
discussions on land concessions. For example, "Israel and 
Syria discussed Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights in 
exchange for peace, with neither conceding priority to the 
other. Israel and Jordan agreed on the agenda, but delayed 
ratification pending Israeli-Palestinian progress...""
The initial Declaration of Principles suggested chat
the Israeli government was caving in to Palestinian demands
of self-rule. There were two agreements concluded, one of
which was the "Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition."'" This
agreement concluded that :
...PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat recognized Israel's 
right to exist, accepted UN Security Council 
Resolution 242 and 338, the Middle East peace 
process, and the peaceful resolutions of conflict.
He renounced terrorism and violence and undertook 
to prevent them. Stating that the articles of the 
Palestinian Covenant that contradict these commit­
ments are invalid, he undertook to submit Covenant 
changes to the Palestinian National Council and
^^Carol Migdalovitz, "The Middle East Peace Process," CRS 
Issue Brief. September 2, 1994 ed.l.
^Ibid.CRS-1
^Ibid.CRS-1
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and called upon the people of the West Bank and Gaza 
to reject violence. Prime Minister Rabin [at this 
time] recognized the PLO as the representative of 
the Palestinian people and agreed to negotiate with 
it.
The Declaration of Principles entailed agreements made about
Palestinian interim self-government for the West Bank and
Gaza. These were the Oslo agreements that were held
secretly between Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and
PLO official Mahmoud Abbas. These principle included:
Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho... to be 
implemented by Israeli withdrawal within four months 
thereafter..."Early Empowerment" or transfer of 
authority over education, culture, health, social 
welfare, direct taxation, and tourism in the West 
Bank and Gaza to Palestinians...Elections in 9 
months of a Palestinian to sit in Bethlehem with 
jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza. 
Palestinians who reside in East Jerusalem will vote. 
Israeli troops will redeploy from Palestinian 
population centers before the election and redeploy 
further as a Palestinian police force assumes re­
sponsibility for public order."
There were further agreements :
Joint Israeli-Palestinian committees will deal with 
common issues such as economic cooperation and 
dispute resolution. The parties will invite Jordan 
and Egypt to establish cooperation arrangements 
that will decide modalities of admission of persons 
displaced in 1967,...During the interim period, 
Israel will be responsible for external security, 
settlements, Israelis, and foreign relations. 
Permanent status negotiations will begin in the 
third year of interim rule (April 13, 1996) and may
include Jerusalem.
^Carol Migdalovitz, "The Middle East Peace Process," CRS 
Issue Brief. September 2, 1994 ed.l3.
"lbid.CRS-14. 
"°Ibid.
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Along with these agreements, Israel managed to make 
agreements with such other Arab nations as Jordan, in which 
Israel agreed to withdraw from "two small strips of land, 
one near the Dead Sea, and one near Lake Tiberias, that it 
seized in 1968."^* The two countries signed a treaty in 
October 1994 to "terminate the state of belligerency" and 
conduct bilateral negotiations on issues like economics and 
combating crime.’-
Oslo II, signed in September of 1995, called for 
further negotiations in expanding Palestinian autonomy in 
the West Bank. This has been labeled the "point of no 
return" for Israel.’- Oslo II has been seen as giving 
Palestinians the chance to acquire an independent Palestine 
state, a reality that would be disastrous for Israel.
The Flaws in Oslo 
Aside from the eventual security implications of an 
independent Palestinian state, there are fundamental flaws 
in the agreement between Israel and the PLO. The PLO has 
already violated the agreement, as has Israel, in 
retaliation.
■’^ Carol Migdalovitz "The Middle East Peace Process," CRS 
Issue Brief, September 2, 1994 ed.l, 15/16.
•’^ Ibid.
’^ Dore Gold, "Caroming Down the Road to Peace," Jerusalem 
Post International October 7, 1995.
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This is in part due to the idea that Israelis and
Palestinians were not seeking the same results. The two
parties had totally different agendas when devising and
signing the OOP. Amos Perlmutter notes that the Israelis
built the process among Israeli "needs and demands," not
wanting to address the issue of Palestinian statehood until
a later date. While Arafat was a "sooner than later" kind
of diplomat that wanted every inch of territory that was
seen as belonging to the Palestinians and sought eventual
statehood for the West Bank and Gaza "including East
Jerusalem," which the Israelis have been steadfastedly
refusing to compromise.’’
The Israelis apparently did not consider the idea that
Arafat might not be sincere in his quest for peace. Arafat
did not hide his aspirations in the least. David Bar-Ilian
has documented that fact :
Addressing "the Palestinian people" on Jordanian 
television on the very day of the signing, September 
13, 1993, Arafat never mentioned peace with Israel 
or the cessation of terrorism. But he did say that 
the Declaration of Principles was the first step 
in the PLO "plan of phases" of 1974.’'
These phases Bar-Ilian is quoting are the phases in which
Israel will eventually become conquered and destroyed.
Palestine becoming a sovereign state in the West Bank and
■‘■‘Amos Perlmutter, "The Israeli-PLO Accord is dead, " 
Foreign Affairs May/June (1995)63.
^David Bar-Illan, "If This Be Peace...," Commentary 
February (1995)31.
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Gaza is just one step closer to this eventuality. This 
probability could lead to the demise of Israel because of 
security risks, such as physical, geographic, and economic 
dangers.
There were numerous suppositions in the tenets of 
Oslo, one of which was the idea that Arafat was a diplomat, 
willing to stop terrorist attacks from the West Bank and 
Gaza, and by the PLO, against Israelis. Aside from this, 
negotiating with Arafat does not necessarily produce 
results. The reality is that Arafat has not done this, 
except to curtail them recently, not as an end, but as a 
means to facilitate IDF withdrawal. Also, some believe that 
Arafat is not the sole voice within the PLO as seen by many 
Palestinians. Arafat has lost his credibility and 
popularity over the years, and "just about everybody is 
opposed to him in one way or another...a generation of 
Palestinian nationalists and Muslim fundamentalists has 
emerged in the occupied territories to violently oppose 
Oslo, demanding the destruction of Israel proper and an end 
to land-for-peace d i p l o m a c y . T h e  former Rabin government 
apparently ignored Israeli intelligence estimates that 
Arafat no longer held the power he once did over this new 
generation of militants and that he was hated by many PLO
‘^ Amos Perlmutter, "The Israel-PLO Accord is Dead," 
Foreign Affairs May/June (1995)61.
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v e t e r a n s . Dore Gold describes Arafat as being 
"immeasurably weaker than any other head of state.
Therefore, it was imprudent co think that Arafat could, or 
would, for that matter, have halted terrorist activities 
being carried out by Hamas or Jihad, two notorious terrorist 
organizations. In fact, in an earlier article, written in 
1995, before these terrorist groups started to feel a bit 
more unity, it was written that, "Hamas leaders use Arafat's 
agreement with Israel as a pretext to brand him a 
traitor.However, these opposing Muslims would come to 
know that Arafat's land-for- peace agreement was just a 
phase in a strategy of phases to wipe out Israel. They will 
eventually stand with him again.
There have been quite a few terrorise attacks on 
Israel since Oslo's signing. In fact, the degree of attacks 
would make one think that Arafat had done absolutely nothing 
to curb these activities. Many attacks occurred very 
shortly after the signing, and were rumored to have been 
done by Arafat's own sect of the PLO, "in the months after 
the DOP was signed, there was intensified violence by Arabs 
against Jews, some of it perpetuated by Arafat's own Fatah
‘^ Amos Perlmutter, "The Israel-PLO Accord is Dead," 
Foreign Affairs May/June (19 95)63.
■•^ Dore Gold, "Where is the Peace Process Going?," 
Commentary August (1995)40.
■‘^ David Bar-Illan, "If This Be Peace...," Commentary 
February (1995)31.
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faction."'° And, in the few months prior to Oslo II, "in 
gross violation of his commitment under the agreement, 
Arafat's wing of the PLO, Fatah, carried out at least twelve 
terrorist a t t a c k s A r a f a t  had no real desire to 
prevent this violence and still does not.
In the first few years surrounding the agreement,
Arafat failed to abide by his commitments:
Arafat...has failed to keep several commitments he 
made in Oslo: to discipline PLO members who engage 
in terrorism; to pursue, apprehend, and extradite 
terrorists to Israel; to refrain from hiring 
fugitive terrorists as policemen; and to condemn 
terrorist attacks explicitly. In addition to all 
that, Farouk Kaddoumi (who, in another violation of 
the agreement, has appeared at the UN as the 
"Foreign Minister of Palestine") consistently and 
openly calls for the continuation of the "armed 
struggle.
And in the intermittent years between 1995 and the present, 
there has been no end to the accounts of terrorist 
activities in Israel.
In 1996 the new Likud party took office in Israel, 
with Benjamin Netanyahu as the Prime Minister. No one 
doubts his opposition to Oslo; however, with the
^Douglas Feith, "Land for no Peace," Commentary June
(1994)33 .
“David Bar-Illan, "If This Be Peace...," Commentary
(1995): 30. He gives an example of an attack on an Israeli 
policeman by known members of Fatah. It was reported in the 
Palestinian newspaper as being committed by members of 
Hamas. In addition, the reporters were threatened if they 
revealed any true identities.
“ Ibid.
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assassination of Rabin in 1995, Netanyahu had no choice but 
to continue the process, with care. There are, however, 
issues attached to Oslo that Mr. Netanyahu will not bend on.
The Netanyahu government decided in 1996, for reasons 
of tourism, to open an exit from a "Hasmonean-era tunnel in 
the vicinity of the Temple Mount in Jerusalem."'' The 
Palestinians, Arafat, in particular, denounced this as a 
violation of their religion, being so close to their holy 
mosque, and retaliated by throwing stones and Molotov 
cocktails and firing upon Israeli soldiers with the very 
automatic weapons that Israel itself gave the Palestinian 
Authority when they were finally granted autonomy. In the 
end, seventy three people died and fifteen hundred people 
were injured.“ As it turned out, the tunnel's new exit was 
nowhere near the holy mosque, it was just another excuse for 
violence.
In February of 1996:
...suicide bombers had blown themselves up in two 
Jerusalem buses, at a soldiers' pick up station 
in Ashkelon, and on a crosswalk in a Tel Aviv 
shopping center; an Islamic fanatic had plowed his 
car into a crowd waiting at a bus stop in 
Jerusalem; and five youths loaded with explosives 
had been apprehended while trying to penetrate an 
Israeli settlement in the Gaza district. Except 
for the Gaza attack, eveiry one of these operations 
resulted in deaths-62 all told. This brought the 
total terror fatalities in the 31 months since the
“Douglas Feith, "A Strategy for Israel," Commentary 
September (1997)25.
“Norman Podhoretz, "The Tragic Predicament of Benjamin 
Netanyahu," Commentary December (1996)34.
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signing of the Oslo agreements to 213, the largest 
number in any such period since the establishment 
of the state.
It has been speculated that terrorism is not only increasing 
since Oslo, but it is more efficient in its taking of lives. 
The PLO and the PA are more advanced in their weaponry and 
more organized, because of their new mini-state."
Furthermore, the new PA has been consistent in its own 
violations of Oslo. The PA has failed to "confiscate the 
illegal arms in the hands of terrorist groups like Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad; the recruitment of terrorists into the PA 
security forces,- the refusal to hand over terrorism suspects 
to Israel for prosecution; the rapid release of terrorists 
from PA prisons; the conduct of official PA operations in 
Jerusalem; the use of incendiary anti-Israeli rhetoric by 
Arafat and other PA officials, including calls for jihad and 
praise of suicide bombers as "martyrs and heroes"; and the 
PA'S failure to amend the Palestinian Covenant, which calls 
for the eventual destruction of Israel.'" The Palestinian 
Covenant was supposed to be amended at the signing of Oslo 
and has yet to be changed. The Palestinian National Council 
had announced that it had been amended, but not a single
^^David Bar-Illan, "The Wages of Oslo," Commentary May
(1996) 23 .
“ Ibid.,23-24.
“Douglas Feith, "A Strategy for Israel," Commentary 
September (1997): 25.
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word is different; it still calls for the destruction of 
Israel.“
The Future
With all these violations, terrorism and anti-Israeli 
rhetoric, how can Israel prevail? The answer seems to be 
that it will not. The Palestinians have proved recently 
what other Arab nations have proven in the in the past.
There is no prospect of real peace. Israel has just given 
the Palestinians their own state, essentially, , and the 
violence continues. What can Israel do now? There is no 
turning back.
One option for Israel now is to take back the West 
Bank and Gaza from the Palestinians, in direct violation of 
Oslo.“ The world seems disgusted at Benjamin Netanyahu's 
hard line policy, but has not addressed the problems of the 
many Israelis and Arabs that are dying as a result of PLO,
PA, and other Islamic militant groups that violate the 
Accords every day. The option of Palestinian statehood is 
forgotten at this point because security dangers are too 
risky. If the Palestinians are granted their own state, the
Israelis will not be able to take it back once accepted. It
will be sovereign and the violence will only increase on 
Israel's small borders.
“Norman Podhoretz, "The Tragic Predicament of 
Netanyahu," Commentary December (1997)32.
59 Ibid.,40.
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Another option may be to continue stalling, and "pay 
lip service" to Oslo supporters, without granting anything 
further. Israel will continue to try and avert terrorism 
and continue to watch its partners in the treaty abrogate 
the demands put on them by its signing. However, "stalling 
is not a winning strategy. The appearance of stalling 
damages the government's credibility at home and abroad. If 
it claims to be committed to Oslo but fails for weeks and 
months to move the process along, Israel looks 
d i s i n g e n u o u s . S o ,  unfortunately, Israel is caught in a 
bind, of which there is no way out now, and which 
furthermore, could have been avoided in 1991, 1993 and 1995. 
A fact that cannot now be ignored is the prospect of 
Palestinian statehood. The dangers that might emerge from 
this prospect for Israel are endless.
“Douglas Feith, "A Strategy for Israel," Commentary 
September (1996)28.
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SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF A PALESTINIAN STATE
Surrounded by Hostility 
In relinquishing these territories and granting 
autonomy to the Palestinians, Israel has helped to pave the 
way for an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank.
It is no secret that this is the aspiration of Yasser 
Arafat. He has been quoted in the Jerusalem Post on 
September 3, 1993, as saying "The Palestinian state is 
within our grasp. Soon the Palestinian flag will fly on the 
walls, the minarets and the cathedrals of Jerusalem."'* 
Arafat has been quoted in the Jerusalem Post on September 
19, 1993, as claiming "Our first goal is the liberation of 
all occupied territories and return of all refugees, self- 
determination for the Palestinians and the establishment of
“Americans for a Safe Israel, "Quotes You Can Use," 
Organizing for Israel: A Guide to Zionist Activities.
33
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a Palestinian state whose capitol is Jerusalem. An 
establishment of a Palestinian state will be detrimental 
to Israel.
Historically, Israeli concession of land for peace 
never helped to counter any feelings of anti-Semitism. It 
will be unlikely that a new concession of land will change 
those feelings. Years of occupation and defeat have 
aggravated these anti-Semitic feelings. It is a bizarre 
mistake to compare the Israeli occupation and treatment of 
the Palestinians in those occupied areas, to the treatment 
of the Jews by the Nazis. David Bar-Illan writes that 
"Portraying Israel as a latter-day Nazi-Germany is, of 
course, a favorite Arab propaganda line.'"' This portrayal 
of Israel as a modern Nazi-machine, helps Arab propagandists 
create a tarnished and evil Israeli image, one inviting 
hatred and invoking violence.
This hostility will prove to be a vital security 
threat to Israel. Peace is not something that will happen 
overnight. The long time refusal most Arab states to
“Americans for a Safe Israel, "Quotes You Can Use," 
Organizing for Israel: A Guide to Zionist Activities. There 
are also quotes by Nabil Sha'ath, the senior aide to Arafat, 
as saying,"Gaza-Jericho first means total exercise of 
Palestinian sovereignty over the two regions as a first step 
toward an independent Palestinian state." This was in the 
Jerusalem Post on Sept. 10, 1993. Another quote is by Sari 
Nusseibeh, a PLO negotiations leader that states "its no 
secret that we are working towards Palestinian state in 
less than five years. Jerusalem Post Sept. 22, 1993.
“David Bar-Illan, "Israel: Guilt and Politics,"
Commentary May (1994)25.
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recognize Israel cannot be believed to change with the 
signature of an agreement. One fact is, that the only way 
true peace can become a reality is if the Arabs truly 
recognize Israel as a sovereign entity. This attempt has 
been made before with the Camp David Accords. Egypt failed, 
in practice, to recognize Israel as legitimate. Douglas 
Feith wrote that peace "has to do with attitudes of mind- 
with a mutual belief that each state has sovereign rights 
and a shared conviction that no party should take what 
belongs to a n o t h e r . S i n c e  it is clear that the Arabs 
believe that Israel has robbed land in the past, it is 
highly probable that they have not changed their minds.
The hostile attitude, the terrorist activity, and the 
outward aggression aimed at Israel does not seem to be 
suspended. Israel is the enemy, past and present. Syria's 
long time hatred of the Israelis and Egypt's call to "throw 
the Jews into the sea" is not a sentiment that it is easily 
changed by relinquishing territory. Israel will always be 
in danger in the midst of this hostility. A treaty will not 
change this and the Palestinian Covenant proves this.
The Palestinian Covenant
There has been a continual call for the destruction of 
Israel. The most vocal organization is the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization. A vital part of the Oslo Accords
“Douglas Feith, "A Mandate for Israel," The National 
Interest Spring (1993)
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was the promise of Yasser Arafat to change the Palestinian 
Covenant, which calls for the destruction of Israel.
Arafat and the followers of his ideology believe the 
land that Israel occupies to be Arab homeland. This is not 
just the West Bank and Gaza, but all land integral to 
Palestine before the British Mandate in the 1920's. In the 
Palestinian Covenant, it states in Article 2 that 
"Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British 
Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.'"'-
The entire Covenant repeatedly calls for the 
liberation of Palestine and the return of this land to its 
rightful owners-the Palestinian people. The Covenant 
declares the Balfour Declaration and the Partition Plans of 
1947 completely illegal (this Declaration and partition 
designs gave Israel its tiny beginning). Some excerpts from 
the Covenant are as follows :
Article 3 : The Palestinian people possess the legal 
right to their homeland and have the right to 
determine their destiny...
Article 19 : The partition of Palestine in 1947 and 
the establishment of the State of Israel are 
entirely illegal regardless of the passage of time, 
because they were contrary to the will of the 
Palestinian people and to their natural right in 
their homeland...
Article 20 : The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate 
for Palestine and everything that has been based
“Jillian Becker, The PLO-The Rise and Fall of 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1984)231.
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upon them, are deemed null and void...“
The Covenant also insists on liberating the land through an
armed struggle and that this struggle will not cease until
the Palestinians have their victory. Articles 9, 10, and 30
illustrate this point:
Article 9: Armed struggle is the only way to 
liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall 
strategy, not merely a tactical phase. The 
Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute 
determination and firm resolution to continue 
their armed struggle and to work for an armed 
popular revolution for the liberation of their 
country and their return to it...
Article 10: Commando action constitutes the nucleus 
of the Palestinian popular liberation war. This 
requires its escalation, comprehensiveness and 
mobilization of all the Palestinian popular and 
educational efforts and their organization and 
involvement in the armed Palestinian revolution... 
Article 30 : Fighters and carriers of arms in the 
war of liberation are the nucleus of the popular 
army which will be the protective force for the 
gains of the Palestinian Arab people.'"
Finally, the Covenant describes Zionism as an entity that is
to be regarded as racist and aggressive and should be
destroyed :
Article 22: Zionism is a political movement 
organically associated with international 
imperialism and antagonistic to all action for 
liberation and to progressive movements in the 
world. It is racist and fanatic in its nature, 
aggressive, expansionist, and colonial in its aims.
“Jillian Becker. The PLO-The Rise and Fall of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1984),233. The article goes on to say that the 
Jews insistence that Palestine is their homeland in 
inconsistent with history and that Judaism is a religion not 
a nationality, so Israel cannot be a state based on 
religion.
“ Ibid.,231-234 .
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and fascist in its methods. Israel is the 
instrument of the Zionist movement, and a 
geographical base for world imperialism placed 
strategically in the midst of the Arab homeland to 
combat the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation, 
unity, and progress. Israel is a constant source of 
threat vis-a'-vis peace in the Middle East and the 
whole world. .
The articles of the Covenant makes the PLO's intentions 
clear. By Arafat's own reluctance to change these 
provisions, his announcement that peace is the intention is 
not authentic. The Covenant has not yet been modified and 
this poses a threat to Israel. The prospect for its 
destruction by aggressive means is not preposterous.
The original Israeli hope was that an autonomous 
Palestinian entity will be satisfied with it's new identity. 
There was the vision of a demilitarized, autonomous region 
in the West Bank, but adherence to this demilitarization is 
improbable. As Rabin himself once phrased it, "the number 
of broken treaties in the Middle East is equal to the number 
signed."'- In addition, there is no way to stop a country 
from breaking these kind of demilitarization agreements, if 
they are being devious and covert.D avi d Bar-Illan has 
given an example of this type of covert betrayal in
“Jillian Becker, The PLO-The Rise and Fall of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1984), 233. The article asks for help from other 
progressive forces and declares that the liberation of 
Palestine will destroy the Zionist movement.
“David Bar-Illan, "Why a Palestinian State is Still a 
Mortal Threat," Commentary November (1993)29.
""Ibid.
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describing what could happen in an independent Palestinian 
state :
...Iraq has shown, despite all the sophisticated 
monitoring available today, a sovereign country can 
accumulate heavy arms undetected. With its own air­
ports and seaport, and with free movement across the 
Jordanian border, the new Palestinian state could 
acquire not only tanks but also fighter planes and 
heavy artillery.'*
In addition, if a state becomes sovereign, how would Israel
enforce such standards? The Palestinians will most likely
ignore any agreements, for three reasons. Aharon Levran
explains these reasons as, "First and foremost, because such
arrangements are by nature restrictive and humiliating-
inhibiting independence, freedom of action, and certainly
sovereignty... Second, the likely circumstances in which
their state would be born will certainly stiffen their
positions and affect their willingness to remain restricted
and humiliated...Third, when the discussions on security
arrangements took place it would mean that a Palestinian
state was already fait accompli, and what remained was a
question of price .'“~
After all, if Palestine becomes a separate entity and
an independent state, they should be able to have a military
“David Bar-Illan, "Why a Palestinian State is Still a 
Mortal Threat," Commentary November (19 93)29.
“Aharon Levran, "The Military Dangers of a Palestinian 
State," Global Affairs Fall (1989)144. His explanations were 
written before the Oslo Accords and the official peace 
process was started. There were security discussions in the 
Accords of which the Palestinians did agree to comply with, 
but his premonitions may turn out to be correct.
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force like all other sovereign nations. In an article 
written by Louis Rene' Benes and Zalma Shoval, it is 
declared that, "Because of the right of sovereign states to 
maintain military forces essential to self-defense is 
certainly such a rule, Palestine could...be entirely within 
its right to abrogate any treaty that had compelled its 
demilitarization.Any kind of military force, very 
possibly a combined Arab force, is a threat to Israel 
because of Israel's geographic vulnerability in the event of 
Palestinian statehood.
Geographical Implications of an Independent Palestinian
State on Israel
Geographically, Israel is a small country. The 
relinquishment of this additional land will bring Israel 
back to its original pre-war 1967 borders. This proposes 
grave dangers for Israel with no hope for anything but grave 
consequences. The territory that Israel returns is vital to 
its security and the location vis-a'-vis Israel could bring 
unfortunate disaster to Israel if surrounded by hostile 
neighbors.
Benjamin Netanyahu asserts that "There can be no 
disputing that the protective wall of the West Bank is 
crucial for Israel's defense. But there can also be no
"'Louis Rene Benes and Zalma Shoval ed. by Patrick M . 
Cronin, "Why a Demilitarized Palestinian "Entity" Would Not 
Remain Demilitarized: The View According to International 
Law," Strategic Review Summer (1995)73.
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disputing that a large number of Arabs live on this wall.
If Israel were to relinquish control of the West Bank, it 
would create a security n i g h t m a r e . T h i s  sheds light on 
Netanyahu's current 1998 position on Palestinian autonomy.
In sizing up Israel, after returning the land and a
new Palestinian state eventually emerges, Aharon Levran
explains that:
Israel within the Green Line [pre-'67 lines] is only 
14 kilometers wide at the narrow waistline of the 
coastal plain, four times smaller than the West 
Bank, which is 55 kilometers broad as the crow flies 
(Qalqilia to Jordan). Roughly two-thirds of the 
population of Israel resides along the coastal strip 
from Akko to Ashod, as well as 80 percent of its 
industrial plants.“
Levran continues :
The main geo-military implications of this data 
indicate the importance of Judea and Samaria to 
Israel's security, particularly in terms of the 
defense of its most vital territory. The facts 
point out the vulnerability of most of the cities 
and population of Israel, which are at the very 
mercy of whoever commands the mountain range to the 
east. They also indicate that the defensive 
capability from the eastern slopes of Judea and 
Samaria is far more efficient than that of the 
western slopes...Above all, it is patently clear 
that Israel lacks the ability to build a plausible 
defensive disposition in the flat strip 14-20 kilo­
meters wide that is its vital territory.“
Benjamin Netanyahu shares this same line of reasoning. He
maintains that :
“Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York: 
Bantam Books, 19 93)294.
"'^ Aharon Levran, "The Military Dangers of a Palestinian 
State," Global Affairs Fall (1989)134.
“ Ibid.,135.
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The topography of the Judean and Samarian mountains 
is particularly well suited for the delaying actions 
necessary for Israel's defense. To an invader from 
the east, this range is an extraordinary obstacle 
that must be overcome to reach the Israeli coastline 
...The West Bank thus provides Israel not only with 
strategic depth but with strategic height.'"
In an article entitled "The West Bank and Military
Technology," Edward Bar illustrates:
The West Bank...was divided into three north-south 
trending topographic and strategic zones. The 
Eastern Zone, adjacent to the central sector of the 
of the Israel-Jordan border, comprises Israel's side 
of the Jordan River floodplain and the step like 
cliffs that form the rim of the Rift Valley. The 
The Central Zone is a narrow strip defined by the 
mountainous spine, rising in several locations to 
three thousand feet above sea level and providing 
ideal sites for early warning radar stations. The 
Western Zone encompasses the Judean and Samarian 
foothills that dominate Israel's populated coastal 
plain.“
When clarifying his in-depth study of the geographic 
importance of the West Bank, Sar concludes the three-fold 
zone system has "war deterrent qualities in a static 
confrontation... movement - impeding characteristics, natural
“Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1993)263-65. The strategic depth that 
Netanyahu describes is the amount of space that Israel has a 
buffer zone. He defines strategic depth as "the distance the 
enemy has to cover before it can enter Israel's populated 
areas, inflict enormous civilian casualties, and conquer its 
cities translates into the time that Israel has to mobilize. 
The farther the advancing column has to travel, the more 
likely it is that air harassment and resistance on the 
ground will be able to stem the advance and therefore 
purchase time for the mobilization and deployment of
‘’^ Edward Sar, "The West Bank and Military Technology, " 
Global Affairs Summer/Fall (1990)148.
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obstacles, and vantage points..." that are "vital to the 
dynamics of modern war."^°
In discussing the Gaza Strip, Aharon Levran states that 
it does not pose the same scale of threat to Israel as the 
West Bank, but nevertheless the threat is still there.
Levran explains, "Because of its geographical proximity no 
the Southern settlements and to the center of Israel, and 
its location on a principal axis of access from the south to 
Israel's vital territory and Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip has 
the potential to serve as a forward hostile base...'"^” The 
importance of these lands to Israel's security is 
geographically apparent.
Military Implications of an Independent Palestinian State on
Israel
Aside from the obvious geographical security 
implications of Palestine becoming an independent state, 
there are serious military dangers as well. Geography 
points out the vulnerable position that Israel will be in, 
surrounded by land that can provide for an easy attack on 
its most vital areas. The military implications point out 
the more serious danger to Israel posed by the surrounding 
Arabs.
^Edward Sar, "The West Bank and Military Technology, " 
Global Affairs Summer/Fall (1990)148.
^Aharon Levran, "The Military Dangers of a Palestinian 
State," Global Affairs Fall (1989)135.
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Although it would take some time for an independent 
Palestinian state to do damage to Israel on its own, it 
would never have to act unilaterally, because the 
possibility of a unified Arab coalition is promising. This 
kind of coalition, if attempted, could feasibly wipe out an 
Israeli force. In The Military Dangers of a Palestinian 
State. Aharon Levran gives a frightening scenario for 
Israel:
Two such kinds of coalitions are; an "eastern front" 
coalition including the armies of Syria, Jordan, 
and expeditionary forces from Iraq and Saudi Arabia 
at the least, and a comprehensive Arab coalition 
including the Egyptian army as well.
If something like this were to occur, Israeli forces would
be outnumbered. An eastern front coalition would outnumber
Israel's defense force 4:1, but if Israel had the advantage
of being able to mobilize its reserve forces, the number
changes in Israel's favor to 2:1.’' In Israel's Quest for
Security, it is written that :
A recent estimate by Israeli Major General Avraham 
Rotem suggests that in a future war, 'an Arab 
coalition including Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi- 
Arabia-without Egypt, and including a limited 
Iraqi force and a symbolic presence of additional 
forces-will pit Israel against some against some
7,000 tanks, 1,500 quality armored personnel 
carriers, 200 combat helicopters, almost 3,000 
artillery guns, 50-60 surface-to-surface missile 
Launchers, approximately 1,000 planes...and a total 
armed force of between 800,000-900,000 soldiers
’^■Aharon Levran, "The Military Dangers of a Palestinian 
State," Global Affairs Fall (1989)135.
®=Ibid.
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and officers.'"
Of course, the key here is that Israel would have to 
have the time and forewarning of an attack to mobilize its 
reserves and this is an advantage that most likely will not 
be t h e r e . A n  independent Palestinian state will not allow 
Israel to keep intelligence installations in those vital 
areas that it will need to prepare for an attack, for this 
would defeat Palestinian purposes. This kind of surprise 
attack would restrict Israeli defensive capability.'’
There is the argument that Israel was able to ward off 
a combined attack once before and it will be able to do so 
in the future. The problem with this argument is that it is 
not 1967 or 1973 anymore and there have been many evolutions 
in the Middle East since then. Levran states that :
...in 1967 the Israeli Air Force was able to
“Martin Sicker, Israel's Quest for Security (New York: 
Praeger Publishing, 1989)188.
a-iIbid.,136.
“Aharon Levran, "The Military Dangers of a Palestinian 
State," Global Affairs Fall (1989)137. Levran gives a 
scenario of the swiftness of an Arab attack on Israel. He 
writes that an Arab coalition could transport forces "in a 
swift surprise movement to the Green Line, and from there 
attacking the narrow waistline of Israel on the coastal 
strip. Such an attack could be supported by advanced 
military preparations that the Palestinians would undertake 
such as stockpiling light arms and erecting concealed 
obstructions and fortifications on the areas. These 
obstacles could take shape despite restrictive security 
arrangements, through a slow and hidden process." Levran 
explains that this kind of an attack could be maneuvered "in 
less than twelve hours."
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swiftly knock out the principle Arab forces in an 
operation that had a decisive influence on the 
course of the war. Repetition of such an operation 
is almost not feasible due to the extensive 
defensive measures that have been undertaken by the 
Arab air forces... Since then, the Arabs have 
certainly learned from their mistakes, and the name 
of the game is surprise and isolation of the 
battlefield, preventing Israeli troops from 
redressing the balance of forces. Also in 1967, 
Israel... launched the offensive...However, in the 
future there is little guarantee that Israel will 
be able to be the initiator.“
With these changes in mind, the Arabs have newer
weapons at their disposal, and there is an emphasis on the
proliferation of chemical weapons. Many Arab countries have
been developing new technology or have supplied technology
by other countries. Iraq proved that it could be a threat
during the Gulf War with its attack on Israel with a Scud
missile and in an article title Israeli Security in a
Changing World, it is written that "Egypt...has been
developing new surface-to-surface weapons-weapons that
could, especially if there is a violent transfer of power in
Cairo, be used with devastating effect against the Jewish
s t a t e . I n  addition, Beres asserts that:
Syria continues to be another major threat to 
Israel. Late in 1988, Israeli officials expressed 
concern that the Soviet Union had concluded a 
deal to provide Syria with a Sukhoi 24, one of 
Moscow's most sophisticated bomber aircraft.
This plane has the potential to reach strategic 
positions in central and southern Israel.
“Aharon Levran, "The Military Dangers of a Palestinian 
State," Global Affairs Fall (1989)140.
^^Louis Rene' Benes, "Israel's Security in a Changing 
World," Strategic Review Fall (1990)12.
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The Soviets have also supplied to Damascus the 
MIG-29, an aircraft with a combat radius of 1,100 
nautical miles, high performance look-down shoot- 
down radar, and short-range or over-the-horizon 
AA-9 and AA-10 missiles.“
There has also been a wide range of chemical and
biological weapons proliferation among many of the Arab
countries that are hostile towards Israel. For example:
Iraq began production of chemical weapons in the 
early 1960's and now has the capacity to make
1,000 tons annually. Iraq's use of chemical 
weapons in the Gulf War may have killed or in­
jured as many as 45,000 Kurds or Iranians.
Egypt began production of chemical weapons in 
the early 1960's and used these weapons during 
its involvement in North Yemen's civil war in 
that period.
Iran began production of chemical arms in response 
to Iraqi use, and is believed to have used small 
quantities of poison gas by 1987.
Libya obtained poison gas in 1987, apparently 
from Iran, and used chemicals against Chad's 
military forces in 1987.
Syria first received chemical weapons from Egypt 
before the 1973 war, and now manufactures nerve 
gas and other chemical weapons, including 
warheads . ''
Martin Sicker, in his book Israel's Quest for
Security, suggests that there is no need for Israel to feel
comfortable in this new era:
While Israel's security posture today is probably 
better than at any time in history, there is 
little reason for complacency... The unceasing 
flow of sophisticated and increasingly deadly
®®Louis Rene' Benes, "Israel's Security in a Changing 
World," Strategic Review Fall (1990)12.
39 Ibid.
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weapons, including ever longer range missiles, 
and the frightening readiness of some Middle 
Eastern states to engage in chemical warfare, 
may easily upset all rational calculations.“
With these changes taking place over the years in the 
Arab abilities to wage war efficiently, Israel is under 
constant threat. Giving up land and reducing its size to 
relatively nothing only increases the chances of an Arab 
coalition victory.
There are numerous threats posed to Israeli security 
by other Arab nations. If Israel is reduced to its pre-1967 
borders, it will have more to fear than just a new 
Palestinian neighbor. For example, the small and vulnerable 
size of this new Israel will attract the likes of Syria, a 
long time enemy of the Jewish state.
The Threat of Syria and the Return of the Golan Heights 
In addition to a peace agreement with the Palestinians, 
former Prime Minister Rabin entered into negotiations with 
Syria. The negotiations were to center on one issue, the 
Golan Heights. The Heights were captured by Israel in 1967, 
lost, and then recaptured again in the 1973 attack upon 
Israel by Syria and friends.
This territory has become a strategic necessity for 
Israel because it overlooks vital Israeli territory and was 
once a piece of land from which many attacks aimed at Israel
“^Martin Sicker, Israel's Quest for Security (New York; 
Praeger Publishing, 1989)188.
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took place. For example, many farms in Northern Israel have 
been shelled from the Golan in the past.'"' It is important 
that Israel keep this territory. As Ze'ev Begin states,
"The tiny area-400 square kilometers-is of course vital to 
Israeli security."“ Aside from the Israeli need to keep 
hold of the Golan Heights, the prospect of peace with Syria, 
in exchange of anything at all, is extremely questionable.
Syria has never been willing to acknowledge Israel's 
existence, much less acknowledge that Israel's occupation of 
the Golan Heights as legitimate. Syria wants that land 
back, there is no doubt about that, but it is not just the 
Golan that Syria would like to seize. Syria would like to 
have all land included inside Israel's borders and its 
surrounding territories of Gaza and the West Bank. However, 
Syria has never been willing to pay the peace price for ic, 
as Egypt did and as Yasser Arafat purports to be doing 
today. In fact, Syria's war on Israel has never been solely 
about the Golan, or the Palestinian refugees, but rather 
Israel's right to claim legitimacy in the Arab world.
Benjamin Netanyahu, the present day Prime Minister of 
Israel and Likud Party leader, has always believed the fight
“Daniel Pipes, "Is Damascus Ready for Peace?" Foreign 
Affairs Fall (1991)44.
“Ze'ev Begin, A Zionist Stand (London: Frank Cass &Co. , 
1993)147.
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is not "territorial but existential.Netanyahu discusses 
in his 1993 book, A Place Among Nations, that while 
attending the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, the subject 
matter kept turning away from peace and always back to 
question of Israel's right to exist. He remembers sadly the 
Syrian Foreign Minister at the Peace Conference, 
continuously questioning Israel's right to exist as a 
nation, and ignoring what were to be the primary objectives 
of the Conference: water resources, controls over certain 
lands, and other pertinent issues.“ Netanyahu quotes the 
Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas as once saying "The 
conflict between the Arab nation and Zionism is over 
existence, not borders .
Nevertheless, Syria has continued the fight to take 
back the Golan Heights. It has charged that Israel has 
illegally occupied the lands by referring to a preamble in 
the UN Security Council document that claims that lands 
conquered in war are not recognized as belonging to the 
aggressor.“ However, in this instance, Israel was not the
“Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1993)329.
94 Ibid.,330.
“ Ibid. This quote wa.^  given one year prior to the Madrid 
Peace Conference. It was footnoted by Netanyahu. It was 
obtained by Damascus Television Service, March 7, 1990.
“Samuel Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in 
Palestine (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, New York: 
Steimatzsky/Shapolsky, 1985)188. The Security Council 
preamble talks specifically about "the inadmissability of
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aggressor and the U.N. never branded Israel as an aggressor 
state. Israel preempted an attack on the Arab countries 
that were planning to attack it, so taking the lands was in 
self-defense. Netanyahu states that "Israel has at no point 
set out to conquer anything. It has been repeatedly forced 
into wars of self-defense against Arab regimes ideologically 
committed to its d e s t r u c t i o n . H e  goes on to write that 
the territory of the Golan Heights was continually used as a 
strongpoint for Arab terrorist attacks before and after the 
1967 war.“
Strategically, the relinquishment of the Golan Heights 
will jeopardize Israeli security. The strategic depth of 
Northern Israel, called the "the buffer zone", that allows 
Israel time to mobilize forces in an emergency, is nowhere 
to be found in these new agreements.'"' Martin Sicker 
differentiates between the relinquishment of the Sinai to 
Egypt, which still provided Israel with strategic depth in 
the Negev that separated Israel from the Egyptian frontier, 
and relinquishing the Golan Heights to Syria, which is the 
strategic depth Israel needs to protect itself, because
the acquisition of territory by war...," meaning war by 
aggressors, not self-defense.
“Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1993)140.
“Ibid.
“Martin Sicker, Israel's Quest for Security (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1989)186-87.
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Northern Israel does not have that capacity.S ick er goes 
on to write that "the Golan is much too close to the 
population centers of Northern Israel for the latter to 
seriously consider trading it for a peace agreement as 
generally envisioned by the territory for peace formula.
With this reality, what could have possibly been the basis 
for Rabin and Shimon Peres for considering returning the 
Golan? As Sicker notes, "the question to be answered is 
whether a Syrian signature on a piece of paper is worth 
turning over a piece of strategic real estate that Israel 
paid dearly in blood in 1967 and which was critical in 
preventing the destruction of a large part of Northern 
Israel in 1973 ... Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights is 
in itself a deterrent to a unilateral Syrian military- 
initiative . "
More importantly, Syria's signature on a peace treaty 
could hardly be maintained as legitimate. This is not only 
because Syria does not recognize Israel, but because Syria 
has always maintained that it will only enter into a state 
of nonbelligerency with Israel. This is not peace. The 
concept of "state of nonbelligerency" is questionable, with
'“Martin Sicker, Israel's Quest for Security (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1989)186-87.
“"Ibid.
"°^ Ibid. Sicker notes that Israel's occupation of the 
Golan Heights also gives Israel the room to defend itself by 
being able to conduct major ground assaults on Damascus if 
attacked by Syria.
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regards to Syria. Syria has a long history of signing
agreements and shirking their responsibilities. David Bar-
Illan cites some examples of these agreements:
In 1983, he [Assad] broke a pledge he had made to 
the Reagan Administration that he would accept the 
Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty and withdraw his 
troops from Lebanon. He did the opposite: as soon 
as Israel began to get out, he poured more troops 
into Lebanon.
Assad is also in violation of the Saudi-sponsored 
Taif agreement, endorsed by all the Arab states, 
which stipulates the withdrawal of Syrian troops 
and the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty.
This September [1993] marks precisely a year since 
Syrian troops were supposed to have left Beirut.
If Syria was so willing to abrogate it's agreements in the
Arab arena, it is not likely that Syria will ever abide by
an agreement with Israel.
There are other pertinent factors to examine, when
investigating Syria's past relative to its future with
Israel. For example, the PLO received financial backing
from Syria to help train the Iranian terrorist organization
Hezbollah, a group that has continuously aimed terrorist
activities at I s r a e l . T h e  PLO has been on a quest to
annihilate Israel, and Syria helped them. Syria has enjoyed
"“David Bar-Illan, "Israel's New Pollyanna's," Commentary 
September (1993)29.
"“David Bar-Illan, "If This Be Peace...," Commentary 
February (1995)29. Bar-Illan notes that Hezbollah could not 
have conducted any successful attacks on Israel if it ere 
not for Syria because Syria equips them with weapons and 
trains their fighters on its territory.
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waging "proxy war on Israel through H e z b o l l a h . T h e r e  is 
also the issue of Syria trying to achieve military "parity" 
with Israel. Syria currently spends 50-60 percent of its 
government budget on the military and 3 0 percent of its GNP 
on military e x p e n s e s . T h i s  behavior is indicative of 
preparation, so Syria's quest for true peace should always 
be thoroughly questioned and examined before really 
believing that it is feasible.
Along with these dilemmas, there is the historical 
issue of inter-Arab conflict that make a lasting peace 
impossible for the future of the Middle East. This is not 
just pertaining to Israel. Inter-Arab conflict is 
insolvable as well.
"“David Bar-Illan, "If This Be Peace...," Commentary 
February (1995)29.
"“Daniel Pipes, "Is Damascus Ready for Peace?" Foreign 
Affairs Fall (1991)47.
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C H A P T E R  4
INTER-ARAB DIFFICULTY
The Inter-Arab Question 
"For half a century, Arab governments have hidden behind the
Arab-Israeli conflict""''
The Arab-Israeli conflict is not the only matter 
plaguing the Middle East, nor has it ever been. In fact, it 
could be noted that the majority of the conflict in the 
Middle East is due to inter-Arab conflicts and not the 
Israelis. Far more people have been killed in inter-Arab, 
inter-Islam wars, and by Arab leaders of their own people, 
than in the Arab-Israeli wars. This was just an additional 
problem and a clever way to mask the harsher realities.'
It could be said that the problems with Israel are not 
really secondary but intertwined tightly. In any case.
"^"Augustus Richard Norton and Robin Wright, "The Post 
Peace Crises in the Middle East," Survival Vol.36, No.4 
(Winter 1994-5)7.
"“Dr. Joseph Churba, "The Middle East," Defense and 
Strategic Studies, Southwest Missouri State University, 
October 25, 1995. Dr. Churba specified in this lecture that
Israel is the number one subscriber to the idea that they 
are the center of the conflict, but the center of the 
conflict has always been "who has the right to rule with 
legitimacy in the Middle East?"
55
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
5 6
inter-Arab tensions including basic tyranny, fighting over 
legitimacy, and a fear of an independent Palestinian state 
are just as crucial to peace in the Middle East.
For many years, the world has believed the myth that 
the core of the Middle Eastern problem was Israel. Benjamin 
Netanyahu believed that the advent of the Gulf War finally 
helped to change minds about this prospect. An Arab country 
had invaded another Arab country and it opened the eyes of 
many nations to the realities of the Middle East.""'"
However, it was not as if the reality had not been that 
way for many years prior, it was just not exposed. There 
are scores of wars and cruelty that have taken place in the 
Middle East among a supposed united Arab coalition.
Netanyahu states that since the beginning of Arab statehood, 
that "virtually every one of them had been involved in wars, 
attempts at subversion and assassination, and unending 
intrigue against one or more of its Arab neighbors-and 
against its non-Arab neighbors.""""
Iran and Iraq, until before the Gulf War had been at 
war for up to nine long years, "a devastating conflict that 
claimed well over a million lives and demolished vast
"‘"^Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1993)92.
110Ibid.,93.
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sections of both countries."'*"" Other examples are available
pertaining to this :
Libya has clashed with Tunisia and bombed Sudan 
...Libya has financed numerous efforts to topple 
other Arab regimes or assassinate their leaders 
...Egypt, under Nasser, tries to assassinate 
the leaders of Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq...
Egypt attempted to impose its regime on Syria 
...and began brutal occupation of the nation of 
Yemen...
When they have not been fighting with each other, 
both Yemens have lived in constant fear of Saudi 
Arabia...
Iraq...carried out an energetic campaign of sub­
version and terrorism against a number of Arab 
states, including its traditional enemy Syria, 
and its recent friend Jordan...
Syria...has repeatedly threatened Jordan, murdered 
its diplomats, set off bombs in Amman, and even 
invaded Jordanian territory..."""
With these examples of Arab inter-fighting, it is an odd
thing that Israel would have thought it could live in peace,
simply because they gave land back.
The truth is that many Arab nations use the
Palestinian problem as a justification for trying to gain
what they want. For example, "The Palestinians have often
been used on the inter-Arab scene as the spearhead against
countries suspected of lack of real commitment to qawmiyya,
Arab nationalism. They have also been used to weaken the
position of leading Arab countries, by presenting them as
weak in their commitment to Palestinians and to the Arab
"""Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York: 
Bantam Books, 19 93)93.
"""Ibid. 93-95 .
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cause as a whole."""" The Palestinians have been used to 
make certain Arab countries look important and be recognized 
in the Arab world and the rest of the world, as in the case 
of Syria or Iraq."""" When Saddam Hussein attacked Israel 
with a Scud missile during the Gulf War and demanded its 
relinquishing of the occupied territories, it had very- 
little to do with the invasion of Kuwait. It was a 
secondary issue. In fact, history shows that the Arabs 
cared very little about the Palestinian cause.
The controversial issue of the Palestinian refugees 
has been a constant source of debate among the Arab 
negotiators. Yet, the Arabs did very little for the 
refugees themselves when they left Israel at the Arab 
behest.""' The Arabs used the refugee problem as a means of 
gaining monetary help, getting the world involved in the 
cause, and vilifying Israel. However, it is seldom 
remembered that there were more Jewish refugees from Arab 
states, than Arab refugees from Israel, and they have long 
been absorbed by Israel.
What if Israel, theoretically, will not pose a barrier 
to the independent state of Palestine, what will these Arab
"""Gabriel Ben Gurion, The Palestinians and the Middle 
East Conflict (Tel Aviv : Turtledove Publishing, 1979)157
114 Ibid.
"“Sameul Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in 
Palestine (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, New York: 
Steimatzsky/Shapolsky, 1985)21.
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nations do? Chances are great that their countries will be 
full of conflict and strife because now their own regimes 
will be the focus.""® It is likely that the civilians in 
these Arab countries will demand change and these "demands 
for change are a function of half a century or more of 
corruption, repression, and the arbitrary exercise of 
power. """^  Arab regimes have been able to cultivate and 
maintain this power, in part, due to the problems with 
Israel, but now the technicalities of Israeli occupation is 
over and Israel has recognized Palestinian autonomy. This 
leaves their cause lingering, with the exception of the 
fight to rule Palestine.
The Fight to Rule Palestine 
There have been a number of countries in the past and 
present that will fight to rule over Palestine. There may 
be a new Arab state on the West Bank with specific claims 
and the will to fight for rule over all of Palestine. Syria 
has always maintained that the autonomous regions are a part 
of "Greater Syria" while Arafat claims that Syria is a part 
of Palestine, as well as the past fight between King Hussein 
of Jordan, who claims Palestine to be a part of Jordan,
Augustus Richard Norton and Robin Wright, "The Post 
Peace Crises in the Middle East," Survival Vol.36, No.4 
(Winter, 1994-5)8.
""'Ibid.
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while Arafat believes Jordan to be a part Palestine, both 
being essentially true.""®
In an article "Arab vs. Arab Over Palestine", Daniel 
Pipes argues that there are four groups that have been and 
will be, arguing over the outcome of Palestine. These 
include Palestinian separatists, Arab nationalists, the 
Jordanian government, of which might be ignored considering 
Hussein has since let go of the idea of Jordan's ownership 
of Palestine, and the Syrian government.
The PLO is now what Pipes referred to as Palestinian 
separatists. They assert their right to rule Palestine, but 
really they have just been puppets of other Arab 
governments. In addition to this, the PLO is fragmented 
severely, "made up of almost a dozen fractious groupings 
advocating contrary programs. One Palestinian group is pro- 
Syrian, another pro-Iraqi, and so forth. They disagree on 
ideology and on personnel, who should lead the Nashashibi or 
Husayni family, al-Fatah or the PLFP, As-Sa'iga or Abu 
Nidal, the West Bank notables or yet others?"""" and there 
will be an internal struggle over the issue of Palestine.
"“Daniel Pipes, "Arab vs. Arab Over Palestine,"
Commentary July (1987)17. This article was written in 1987, 
Jordan has since cut his ties of ownership to Palestine, but 
Arafat has not given up the belief about Jordan, thus 
proving a danger to Jordan of an independent state of 
Palestine.
""®Ibid.
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As it is now, many Palestinians are upset over the way 
Arafat is conducting affairs. It has been noted that there 
is a significant amount of people that do not even see 
Arafat as the legitimate leader of the Palestinian people, 
but unfortunately, this has not weakened his position.
Arafat has now what is called a "police state," tyrannical 
and repressive. It is probable that this will make the 
Palestinian people to beg the Israelis to return to the 
territories.
Arafat has not changed the territories into a 
possible legitimate state, not yet. In fact, Arafat has 
done relatively nothing in the way of electoral politics-' 
but has managed to maintain the PLO as a "loosely 
constructed terrorist-guerilla-propaganda structure whose 
cohesiveness is based on loyalty to the man at the top.""""
It is debatable how far the loyalty to Arafat will travel. 
Many people regard him as a traitor for signing the Oslo 
Accords, many have just accepted it, and many applaud him 
for what he is accomplishing, but there is a small group of 
young Palestinians who regard Arafat as a foreigner. To 
make issues more complicated, within the divisions in the 
PLO, there is an unorganized youth coalition that could
"^ °Amos Perlmutter, "Arafat's Police State," Foreign 
Affairs July/August (19 94)9.
“"Ibid.
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present a c h a l l e n g e . O n  e other point worth mentioning 
regarding the PLO is the issue of Arafat's harsh and 
tyrannical treatment of his own people. This is bound to 
pose serious problems internally over who should rule 
Palestine.
The second group that Pipes points out, are the Arab 
nationalists. This group consists of a large Arab coalition 
that believes that Palestine should not become an 
independent entity, but should integrate itself into a 
larger Arab e n t i t y . T h e  Arab nationalists would like to 
unite into one Arab state "that will eventually comprise all 
Arabic speakers between the Atlantic ocean and the Persian 
Gulf, from Morocco to Oman, of which Palestine will be a 
small province.
The third contender in the fight to control Palestine 
is Syria. Syria has always alleged that Palestine is a part 
of Southern Syria and that Palestine was taken from Syria to
"""Amos Perlmutter, "Arafat's Police State," Foreign 
Affairs July/August {1994)10.
"""Nadav Haetzni, "Misery and Terror Reign in Jericho, "
The Yesha Report, May 1995.The article deals with specific 
instances of the Arafat government's treatment of its 
citizens, if they called that as of yet. These entail 
illegally imprisoning them for suspected Israeli 
commiserating and acts of severe torture, sometimes 
resulting in death.
""‘Daniel Pipes, "Arab vs. Arab Over Palestine,"
Commentary July/August (1987)19.
""^ Ibid. This group would include the former Nasser of 
Egypt, Colonel Quaddafi of Libya, and in some cases Iraq and 
Saudi Arabia.
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create Israel.""® In fact, Syria would probably try to fight 
the creation of an independent Palestinian state on this 
basis, unless of course, if it would be a Syrian-puppet 
government.""' It is possible that if Palestine did become 
an independent state, and it will if Netanyahu is not better 
supported, Syria will try to topple the existing regime, 
assuming it might not be Arafat in the future, and gain 
control of it by "proxy wars."""® Syria poses the biggest 
threat here because it is more militarily capable than the 
former contenders. The idea of Syrian imperialism poses not 
just a threat to Israeli people and a Palestinian state, but 
to Jordan as well, since Jordan was a part of Palestine 
before the British Mandate.
Daniel Pipes mentions additional players in the 
competition over Palestine. These players include the 
Muslim fundamentalists, who identify Palestine as a 
"historic part of Muslim patrimony." The Saudi Arabian
""®Daniel Pipes, "Arab vs. Arab Over Palestine,"
Commentary July/August (1987 ,21. See also Commentary, 
December 1986, in an article entitled "Palestine for the 
Syrians" there is a quote by Assad, saying "There is no 
Palestinian people, there is no Palestinian entity, there is 
only Syria!...It is we, the Syrian authorities, who are the 
real representatives of the Palestinian people." Pipes has 
another example from Damascus radio from June 198 0 that says 
"Syria views Palestine-according to historic, cultural, and 
geographic factors-as its own southern province."
""'Michael Widlanski, ed. , Can Israel Survive a 
Palestinian State? (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced 
Strategic and Political Studies, 1990)81.
""®Ibid.
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government has been a long time supporter of this Islamic 
claim to Palestine and the Iranian government also claims 
Islamic ties to Palestine."""
There is going to be conflict in the Middle East long 
after the Arab-Israeli conflict is resolved, if it ever 
really is. There is far too much history of internal strife 
within Arab countries and communities, before and during the 
Israeli issue. There are many wars to look back upon to 
prove this. The fight for power and leadership of the Arab 
world will continue and the domestic problems within each 
country will be emphasized without the Israeli shield to 
hide behind. Most importantly, the fight for leadership in 
the future states of Palestine will be a great source of 
tension and possible disaster
Jordan and Fears of a Palestinian State 
"At stake for Hussein is the economic and political future 
of his Kingdom"
Jordan does support the creation of a third 
Palestinian state because it does not want to alienate 
itself from the rest of the Arab community. However, Jordan 
has almost as much to fear as Israel when it pertains to 
Palestinian statehood. Jordan is weak economically and
"""Daniel Pipes, "Arab vs. Arab Over Palestine, " 
Commentary July/August (1987)22.
""“Lawrence Tal, "Is Jordan Doomed?" Foreign Affairs 
Vol.72, No. 5 (November/December 1993)52.
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physically and stands to lose everything if Palestine 
becomes independent.
There are a few major reasons why Jordan faces grave 
dangers at the creation of a Palestinian state. One, is 
that Yasser Arafat and most other Palestinian officials 
regard Jordan as Eastern Palestine, an integral part of the 
Palestinian state. In Can Israel Survive a Palestinian 
State?. it is written that "Arafat wants to use Jordan 
before he throttles Hashemite rule. The PLO Chairman has 
been willing to deal with King Hussein on a variety of joint 
ventures ... in order to gain a power base which would be 
strengthened later at Hussein's e x p e n s e T h i s  comes as 
no surprise, considering Hussein and Arafat have never been 
on stable terms. Aside from this, there are specific 
reasons why Jordan is viewed as the "other half" of 
Palestine :
First, there is a geographical bond and a 
historical connection between the two banks: the 
West Bank or Trans-Jordan. Secondly, there is a 
large Palestinian Arab population in the Kingdom 
of Jordan. There are independent estimates of 
over 65% Palestinian population throughout Jordan 
and as much as an 80% Palestinian predomination of 
key Jordanian cities."""
"""Michael Widlanski, ed. Can Israel Survive a Palestinian 
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This leads to the second grave danger facing Jordan. 
Because Jordan holds so many Palestinian people that makes 
very likely that they will want to join with the West Bank 
themselves, either out of loyalty or pressures. This could 
provide for future internal conflict for the Jordanian 
citizens that are not Palestinians."’"'
Economically, Jordan is a weak country. It has 
constantly relied upon the support of outside lenders for 
its livelihood, such as the United States. Hussein has a 
legitimate fear that such aid will eventually be given over 
to new Palestinian regions. The United States has already 
committed to aiding the Palestinians. This will cripple 
Jordan, because "Jordan's per capita income is lower than 
that of either the West Bank or Gaza, the unemployment rate 
is 25% and more than 3 0% of the population lives below the 
poverty line."""®
There was the possibility of a joint confederation 
between Jordan and the PLO. However, even though once upon 
a time this would have been in Jordan's favor, the present 
situation is not so kind. The PLO is more powerful than 
before and Jordan is weaker.""® The two entities have had
"""‘Michael Widlanski, ed. Can Israel Survive a Palestinian 
State? (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and 
Political Studies,1990)78.
""^Lawrence Tal, "Is Jordan Doomed?" Foreign Affairs 
"Vol. 72, No . 5 ( November/December, 1993)52.
"“ Ibid.
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nothing lasting in the ways of agreements before and it is 
likely that will not change. In Can Israel Survive a 
Palestinian State?. it is asserted that "The confederation 
would soon dissolve. It would leave an independent 
Palestinian West-Bank/Gaza state or an even greater menace : 
a Palestinian state that had swallowed up Jordan."""'
Jordan might find itself in a difficult position in 
the future, when Palestine becomes its own state. There is 
the possibility of the new Palestinian leadership trying co 
swallow Jordan. There is also the potential that the 
Palestinians in Jordan will want to reunite with the West 
Bank and this will create internal strife. Economically, 
Palestine could become stronger than Jordan. Since a 
confederation of the two entities would fail, Jordan has to 
sit back and watch like the rest of the world at the 
eventual outcome of a Palestinian state.
""'Michael Widlanski, ed. Can Israel Survive a Palestinian 
State? (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced and Political 
Studies, 1990)80.
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CONCLUSION
I.
Land for peace is an old idea for Israel. It is one 
that has never provided them with the conclusions that they 
had anticipated and hoped for. Early evidence of the 
outcome of Resolution 242 and 338 points out these 
agreements as failures, as well as later evidence of the 
Camp David Accords, and the almost immediate and current 
failures of the Oslo Accords.
With respect to Resolutions 242 and 338, these were 
generally rejected by every Arab country. The impossibility 
of the Arabs to understand that Israel did not have to 
relinquish all territory confiscated in self defense, unless 
borders were recognized and a "just and lasting peace" could 
prevail, made the prospects of peace totally unthinkable.
With respect to Camp David, there is something to be 
commended for an Arab country to actually engage in a peace 
treaty with Israel, especially at the expense of itself. It 
is often implied that Egypt sacrificed its place in the Arab 
community by signing a treaty with Israel. However, Egypt 
was eventually allowed to resume relations with other Arab
68
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countries and Israel has rarely to see the desired results 
of the Accord. Egypt has not itself, engaged in attacks on 
Israel, but it has continually aided and abetted countries 
and organizations that have engaged in terrorist activities 
against Israel. For example, Egypt has provided safe havens 
for PLO members. Egypt violated the agreement by putting 
troops in the Sinai when it agreed not to, yet Egypt has 
retained the land that Israel has given back to them in that 
same treaty. Egypt basically signed a mere "treaty of 
nonbelligerence." This was not the idea behind Camp David, 
but this is what Israel got.
Oslo, has been violated by Arafat a number of times. 
The promise to halt terrorism and denounce it has not yet 
materialized, and yet the PLO has already implemented its 
power in the regions that Israel conceded. The PLO Covenant
was supposed to have been changed years ago and only
recently has it been modified, although there is no real
proof of that. This Covenant calls for the complete
destruction of Israel and it is still in existence at a time 
when there is constant Palestinian pressure on Israel to 
stop settlements and get out. Just to revert back to the 
day of the Oslo signing for a brief moment, Arafat pledged 
to his Arab audiences that this whole plan was just a phase 
in a number of phases to eliminate Israel, it should now be 
clear that peace will not come. It is written in the
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Jerusalem Post Editorial that "Pledges to destroy 
Israel...are hardly indicative of peace.""'*
Golda Meir once stated that "The repeated failure of 
international arrangements to safeguard our country's vital 
interests has taught us a lesson we do not easily forget. 
International decisions proved meaningless in each crises 
that we faced...Hence, we inevitably reflect on this history 
when urged to take action which could result in diminishing 
our capacity for self-defense and make us dependent on 
international guarantees.""' Israel should be reflecting 
back in the same way as their once great Prime Minister did 
and realize that peace will never likely surface.
II
Israel should reconsider giving anything more back to 
Arafat for security reasons. Arabs have been opposed to 
Israeli existence from its birth and none of this is going 
to disappear. Virtually all Arab countries have expressed 
the desire to see Israel "thrown into the sea." It is more 
than just a desire for Arab hegemony. It is an underlying, 
and sometimes outright, anti-Semitism that drives them. 
Ideology does not change over a span of a few years and if 
it is really believed that this anti--Semitic sentiment will
138^ Jerusalem Post Editorial, "Solid Paper Facts," 
Jerusalem Post International September 29, 1995, Friday ed
-^^Golda Meir, "Israel in Search of Lasting Peace," 
Foreign Affairs April (1973)454.
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subside by giving back territory, then this would appear to 
be naive.
Geographically, Israel is a small and vulnerable 
country. Israel will eventually have to "pack up and Leave" 
if it relinquishes any more territory. The territory it has 
already given back has not been reciprocated with peace. 
There should be no more movement on Israel's behalf. If so, 
it is viable that Israel will be defenseless in an attack, 
if it did occur. These boundaries leave Israel without the 
necessary strategic depth that it would need to deploy and 
mobilize. An independent state of Palestine, as is hoped by 
Arafat, does not have to stay demobilized. As an 
independent state, it will have the same right to have a 
defense capability as any other independent state. At that 
point, what will Israel really be able to do? Israel cannot 
tell them no, it might have to reconsider this all together.
Even though a Palestinian state could not do too much 
damage on its own, it will not have to. It will have twenty 
other Arab states that may oblige them. The argument that 
Israel was able to defend itself from those borders once 
before and it can do it again, may not prove true anymore. 
Arab nations have become more militarily advanced and the 
weapons they hold now are much more potent and damaging than 
in 1967.
Syria poses a threat in such confining borders.
Syria, aside from the Palestinian Arabs, probably holds the
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highest level of hatred. It would not be totally surprising 
if Syria tried to take advantage of the Israeli size, 
especially with its semi-modern military capabilities. The 
Golan Heights is helpful to Syria, to be able to wage an 
attack on Israel because it could destroy Northern Israel 
from this point. Yet, Israel was, at one point, willing to 
give the Golan back, and this would have been a mistake.
Ill
Finally, Israel is not the center of the Middle East 
crises. It obviously plays a big role in the conflict, but 
not the number one role. Oslo will not bring peace to the 
region if other conflicts are not resolved beforehand.
There is evidence of instability in these regions aside from 
Israel's existence. History shows that inter-Arab wars were 
taking place over a dozen issues, none of them were Israel 
in particular. The results of these inter-Arab conflicts 
were in the form of attempted regime overthrows and 
assassination attempts. In fact, half of the Arab states do 
not even agree on what should happen to the areas in 
question, those being West Bank and Gaza.
Many Arab states fight amongst themselves over who 
will be the best equipped nation to rule an independent 
Palestinian state and some Arab nations, such as Syria, 
vehemently oppose an independent state at all. Factions of 
the PLO vie for leadership. Furthermore, some Arab states 
have more to lose than to gain from this independence, like
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Jordan. This security dilemma imposed on Jordan is both 
physical and economical. These issues would need to be 
addressed and solved if peace were ever foreseeable.
IV
The answer to Israel's dilemma is not really one that 
can be answered easily. If Israel does not relinquish land 
and rule to the Palestinians, terrorism and violence will 
not cease. If Israel does give back more land, if Netanyahu 
decides to cave to pressure, then not only does terrorism 
not cease, but it will be more at risk within such tiny 
borders. Once Israel gives up that land and an independent 
state emerges, there will be nothing short of war that 
Israel can do to reverse the process. Neither option sounds 
inviting, but at least by not releasing more land, Israel 
has a better chance of defending itself in the future.
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